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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutorial discretion is a central component of the federal 
criminal justice system.1  Prosecutors decide which cases to pursue and 
plea bargains to accept, determining the fates of the vast majority of 
criminal defendants who choose not to stand trial.  Prosecutors’ decisions 
are generally not, however, subject to judicial review.2  According to 
federal case law, the separation of powers doctrine is the “primary 
ground” upon which courts abstain from reviewing prosecutorial 
decisions.3  The constitutional separation of powers doctrine does not 
adequately account for expansive prosecutorial discretion.  In tracing the 
federal case law on prosecutorial discretion to the eighteenth century, 
one can identify a connection between the modern theory of 
prosecutorial discretion and a writ of English criminal procedure that 
substantially predated the American separation of powers doctrine. 
In England, the tradition of private prosecution by the crime victim 
was dominant, at least in theory, until late in the twentieth century.4  The 
English Attorney General could dismiss an ongoing prosecution (usually 
initiated by a private party) with a procedural device called the nolle 
prosequi, but the state lacked a public prosecutor who controlled 
criminal prosecutions as a matter of routine.5  In the United States, by 
contrast, the first Judiciary Act established the federal public prosecutor 
as early as 1789.6  The Judiciary Act gave federal prosecutors the 
exclusive power to bring federal criminal prosecutions,7 in a departure 
from the English tradition.  The state monopoly over prosecution is not 
unique; Germany, for example, largely bans private prosecution.8  In 
Germany, however, a rule of compulsory prosecution constrains 
prosecutorial discretion, checking the prosecutor’s ability to pick and 
                                                                                                                            
 1 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §1.9(c) (3d ed. 2007) 
(“There is universal agreement in the modern commentary as to the central role of 
discretionary authority in the administration of the criminal justice process.”). 
 2 See id. §13.2(g). 
 3 See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
 4 See Jonathan Rogers, Restructuring the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
England, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 775, 797–98 (2006) (noting that “the recognition of 
the role of the public prosecutor is still a comparatively recent development in England”). 
 5 See infra Part II.B. 
 6 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (“And there shall be 
appointed in each district a meet person learned in the law to act as attorney for the 
United States in such district, . . . whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all 
delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States . 
. . .”). 
 7 Id. 
 8 See John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 439, 443 (1974). 
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choose which cases to pursue.9  No comparable regime restrains 
American prosecutors. 
The origins of prosecutorial discretion in the federal criminal 
justice system are poorly understood.  Historical scholarship has not 
explained how the American public prosecutor emerged from a common 
law tradition of private prosecution to obtain the power he has today.  
Contemporary federal cases attribute prosecutorial discretion to the 
separation of powers doctrine: federal prosecutors are said to be agents 
of the executive branch, and for that reason the courts cannot review 
their decisions.10  This broad application of the separation of powers 
doctrine is, however, inconsistent with the more measured application of 
the doctrine in other areas of law.11  The doctrine requires more 
justification than contemporary cases provide. 
The historical question raised is how the federal courts came to 
accept the separation of powers doctrine as a justification for expansive 
prosecutorial discretion.  Federal case law from the eighteenth century 
contains the historical roots for prosecutorial discretion and provides 
some insight into how the separation of powers justification developed.12  
In federal case law, the separation of powers theory of prosecutorial 
discretion evolved, at least in part, from the rationale for a procedure that 
actually predated the American public prosecutor: the nolle prosequi. 
Part II reviews the federal law of prosecutorial discretion.  Part II.A 
emphasizes the small number of legal restraints on prosecutorial 
decisions and the frequency with which prosecutors make discretionary 
decisions—rather than taking everything to court—in practice.  Part II.B 
describes the common modern justification for broad prosecutorial 
discretion, the separation of powers doctrine.  This Part points to tensions 
between the Framers’ original notion of separated powers and the 
modern federal prosecutor’s concentrated discretion.  Part II.B also 
compares applications of the separation of powers doctrine in criminal 
procedure with administrative law, which does provide for judicial 
review of executive agencies’ decisions. 
Part III of this article examines case law on prosecutorial discretion 
from the late eighteenth century, when courts discussed prosecutorial 
powers in the context of the nolle prosequi, through the early twentieth 
century, when courts began to invoke the separation of powers doctrine 
                                                                                                                            
 9 Id. 
 10 See infra Part I.B.1. 
 11 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 12 To clarify, I am referring here to the development of the separation of powers 
principle only as applied to the federal prosecutor (what I call the “separation-of-
prosecutorial-power” theory), not as an independent constitutional doctrine. 
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as a justification for prosecutorial discretion.  Furthermore, Part III 
reviews evidence of incremental changes in the theory of prosecutorial 
discretion as the theory has been construed in federal case law.  Based on 
these incremental changes, the nolle prosequi’s royal origins facilitated 
the development of the notion that criminal prosecution is an 
unreviewable executive function.  These historical roots help to account 
for, if not justify, the modern theory of prosecutorial discretion. 
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TODAY 
In American criminal procedure, there are few legal constraints on 
prosecutorial discretion.  The limits that exist stem from other areas of 
law—equal protection and due process—and these constraints rarely lead 
to successful prosecutorial misconduct claims.13  According to modern 
case law, the separation of powers doctrine requires judges to permit 
broad prosecutorial discretion.  In comparing judicial review of 
prosecutorial decisions with judicial review of administrative regulations, 
however, the breadth of prosecutorial discretion stands out, even though 
the separation of powers doctrine applies to both areas of law.  Kenneth 
Culp Davis, who remarked on this comparison in 1969, concluded that 
“[i]n our entire system of law and government, the greatest 
concentrations of unnecessary discretionary power over individual 
parties are not in the regulatory agencies but are in police and 
prosecutors.”14 
Prosecutors have such concentrated discretionary powers because 
of two complementary features of American criminal procedure.  First, 
federal law permits prosecutors to make a number of decisions that are 
not subject to review.15  Second, some features of the modern criminal 
justice system enlarge prosecutorial discretion in practice.16  In this Part, 
I briefly review each of these trends to convey the scope of modern 
prosecutorial discretion. 
A.  The Law Governing Public Prosecutors 
Under federal law, a public prosecutor has exclusive discretion to 
decide whether or not to prosecute any crime that is supported by 
                                                                                                                            
 13 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: 
Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1076 
(1997) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s case law on selective prosecution and concluding 
that “the protection from selective prosecution has been a disfavored right”). 
 14 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 222 
(1969). 
 15 See infra Part I. 
 16 See infra Part I. 
2009] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 5 
probable cause.17  If a prosecutor decides not to pursue a case, the federal 
courts are reluctant to interfere.  The Second Circuit has observed that 
“[t]his judicial reluctance to direct federal prosecutions at the instance of 
a private party asserting the failure of United States officials to prosecute 
alleged criminal violations” is so strong that it applies even when 
“serious questions are raised as to the protection of the civil rights and 
physical security of a definable class of victims of crime and as to the 
fair administration of the criminal justice system.”18 
In addition, standing requirements can bar a claim that a prosecutor 
has wrongfully failed to prosecute a crime.  In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
the Supreme Court held that “a citizen lacks standing to contest the 
policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither 
prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”19  As a result, neither a 
victim nor another interested party can contest a prosecutor’s decision 
not to pursue a case. 
A criminal defendant, who does have standing under Linda R.S., 
can raise a limited array of challenges to “the policies of the prosecuting 
authority.”20  Despite the federal courts’ reluctance to interfere with 
prosecutorial decisions, the law protects defendants from prosecutions 
motivated by unconstitutional considerations.21  A vindictive 
prosecution, in which the prosecutor penalizes the defendant for 
exercising a constitutional or statutory right by charging the defendant 
with a more serious crime, violates the Due Process Clause.22  This 
                                                                                                                            
 17 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined 
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring 
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”); see, e.g., In re United 
States, 397 F.3d 274, 284 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the decision to prosecute rests in 
the prosecutor’s discretion as long as probable cause exists); Belmontes v. Woodford, 
350 F.3d 861, 892 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 315 
(4th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(same); Am. Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. HUD, 170 F.3d 381, 384 (3d Cir. 
1999) (observing that the decision not to prosecute is within the province of the executive 
branch). 
 18 Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 19 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Linda R.S. was distinguished and found inapplicable in 
Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility, 477 F.2d at 378. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Prosecutorial Discretion, 34 GEO. L.J ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 197, 201– 
210 (2005) (discussing constitutional constraints on prosecutorial discretion and 
reviewing the case law). 
 22 See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (“To punish a person because he has done 
what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, 
and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a 
person’s reliance on his legal rights is patently unconstitutional.”) (internal citations 
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principle does not, however, preclude the type of negotiations common 
in the plea bargaining process.23  Similarly, a selective prosecution based 
on race, religion, or other impermissible criterion violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.24  To sustain either claim (typically in a motion to 
dismiss the indictment or in a habeas petition), the defendant bears a 
heavy burden of proof.25  The prosecutor’s cost benefit assessments, or 
judgments about the public interest at stake in certain types of 
prosecutions, are not subject to challenge.26 
Beyond the decision of whether or not to prosecute, a federal 
prosecutor also has discretion in deciding how to prosecute.  The 
prosecutor chooses which crime to charge, as the Supreme Court “has 
long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, 
the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not 
discriminate against any class of defendants.”27  The prosecutor chooses 
when to grant immunity,28 accept a plea bargain,29 and dismiss charges.30 
                                                                                                                            
omitted); United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that a 
vindictive prosecution claim arises when the prosecution brings more serious charges 
after the defendant exercises his right to appeal, in the context of the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the indictment). 
 23 See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (addressing a habeas petition).  The Court 
differentiated between the “unilateral” imposition of a penalty and the “give-and-take 
negotiation” of the plea bargaining process to draw this distinction. Id. at 362. 
 24 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (addressing a motion to dismiss 
the indictment); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (deciding a habeas petition); 
see, e.g., Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, 72 n.5 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that selective 
prosecution violates equal protection, and that selective prosecution claims are exempted 
from the general proscription against judicial review of prosecutorial decisions, in the 
context of a motion to dismiss the indictment). 
 25 See Poulin, supra note 13; Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 21, at 202–10. 
 26 See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186–87 (1992); Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. 
 27 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979). Under the Reno 
Memorandum, promulgated in 1993 and superseded by the similarly-worded Ashcroft 
Memorandum in force today, federal prosecutors are instructed to charge “the most 
serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant’s conduct, that is likely 
to result in a sustainable conviction.”  Janet Reno, Reno Bluesheet on Charging and Plea 
Decisions (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 352 (1994); see Memorandum 
from Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft 3 (July 28, 2003), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 375, 
376 (2003). As Kate Stith has observed, however, this departmental policy is largely 
unenforceable. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the 
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1450, 1470 (2008). 
 28 See, e.g., United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the power to grant use immunity is delegated exclusively to executive branch, and that 
the prosecutor had discretion to deny a witness use immunity based on the government’s 
desire to collect evidence to use against him if he violated plea agreement); United States 
v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 87 (1st Cir. 2000) (“A United States Attorney’s authority to 
grant use immunity is implied from her statutory authority to make decisions anent 
prosecution.”). 
 29 See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481–82 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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Once those choices are made, “no court has any jurisdiction to inquire 
into or review” a prosecutor’s decision to treat differently “[t]wo persons 
[who] may have committed what is precisely the same legal offense.”31 
B.  Opportunities to Exercise Discretion in Practice 
The modern criminal justice system provides federal prosecutors 
with incentives to make many decisions that have dramatic consequences 
for criminal defendants, but are never reviewed in court.  As a result, 
prosecutorial discretion in practice is even broader than the case law 
implies.  The large federal criminal code, heavy caseloads, and prevalent 
plea-bargaining all increase the federal prosecutor’s influence over 
criminal adjudications. 
The federal criminal code has grown substantially in the last two 
centuries.  In the December 1873 Revised Statutes, the title on federal 
crimes listed 183 separate offenses.32  Today, Title 18 of the U.S. Code 
contains over one thousand distinct crimes,33 including many enacted in 
                                                                                                                            
 30 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) provides that “The government may, 
with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint. The government 
may not dismiss the prosecution during trial without the defendant’s consent.” FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 48(a). Some federal circuits have held that courts can withhold leave to dismiss 
if and only if the prosecutor’s request is “clearly contrary to manifest public interest.”  
See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975), cited without disapproval 
in Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 30 (1977). As Judge Posner has noted, though, 
“[w]e are unaware, however, of any appellate decision that actually upholds a denial of a 
motion to dismiss a charge on such a basis.”  In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
 31 Newman, 382 F.2d at 481–82. 
 32 70 Rev. Stat. (2d ed. 1878). 
 33 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 514 (2001). Stuntz provides an institutional account of the federal 
criminalization phenomenon, analyzing the incentives of the legislature, judiciary, and 
executive branch that lead to the expansion of the criminal law. His account implicates 
prosecutorial discretion: 
[D]iscretionary enforcement frees legislators from having to worry about 
criminalizing too much, since not everything that is criminalized will be 
prosecuted; likewise, legislative power liberates prosecutors, widening their 
range of charging opportunities. Next is the relationship between 
legislatures and courts: the accumulation of criminal statutes constrains 
courts, both by taking away lawmaking opportunities and by blunting the 
effect of judicial tools like vagueness doctrine and the rule of lenity. Last 
comes the relationship between prosecutors and courts: prosecutors keep 
courts at bay by using the charging opportunities legislators give them to 
generate guilty pleas. Guilty pleas, of course, avoid adjudication altogether; 
they leave courts very little role to play. Notice the nature of these 
relationships: prosecutorial and legislative power reinforce each other, and 
together both these powers push courts to the periphery. 
Id. at 528. 
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the past three decades.34  When criminal statutes overlap, as many federal 
crimes do,35 the prosecutor can choose among the statutes in pursuing 
prosecution.  As a result, the rule that “when an act violates more than 
one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either” 
provides federal prosecutors with even more discretionary power today 
than it did when the Supreme Court stated it in 1979.36 
The increase in the number of federal crimes has led to an increase 
in the number of federal criminal prosecutions.37  Prosecutors with large 
caseloads lack the resources to take every case to trial.38  Today, plea 
bargains are far more common than trials.  The plea bargaining process 
facilitates “prosecutorial adjudication,”39 in which the prosecutor serves 
as the “central adjudicator of facts (as well as replacing the judge as 
arbiter of most legal issues and of the appropriate sentence to be 
                                                                                                                            
 34 According a 1998 American Bar Association report, “more than a quarter of the 
federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted within a 
sixteen year period since 1980.”  TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 & n.9 (1998). 
 35 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to 
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be 
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign 
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing 
such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both.”) with 18 U.S.C. §1344 (2006) (“Whoever knowingly executes, or 
attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to 
obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or 
under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or 
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”). 
 36 See supra note 27; see also William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal 
Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2550 (2004) (describing this 
phenomenon and concluding that “[t]he greater the territory substantive criminal law 
covers, the smaller the role that law plays in allocating criminal punishment”). 
 37 From 1870 to 1880, the average number of criminal cases that terminated in the 
federal courts each year was 6,984.  The number peaked (at one point above 95,000) 
during the Prohibition era, and dropped back to 38,667 in 1934.  The figure has increased 
relatively steadily since then, resulting in an average of 76,519 criminal defendants per 
year in the federal system between 2000 and 2002. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial 
Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 
89 (2005). 
 38 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 8 (reviewing scholarship that linked caseload pressure to the 
rise of plea bargaining). 
 39 Gerard Lynch coined the term “prosecutorial adjudication” in Gerard E. Lynch, 
Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2141 (1998).  
Westlaw searches of the phrase “prosecutorial adjudication” reveal that Judge Lynch 
used it first. 
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imposed).”40  The prosecutor evaluates culpability and chooses the 
charge for which he will accept a guilty plea.  That charge is 
accompanied by an “advisory” sentencing guideline promulgated by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, and judges more often than not sentence 
within the guideline range.41  As a result, the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion affects almost every step of the criminal justice process, from 
charging to sentencing. 
C.  The Modern Judicial Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutors could not have acquired their broad discretion without 
some judicial acquiescence.  Many aspects of contemporary 
prosecutorial practice resemble matters traditionally left to judges, 
particularly the “prosecutorial adjudication” of the plea bargaining 
process.42  A judge could expand or reclaim his discretionary powers by 
limiting those of federal prosecutors.43  The federal courts have not done 
so; instead, federal case law has concluded that judges are 
constitutionally prohibited from interfering with prosecutorial decisions.  
The most common support for this conclusion is the separation of powers 
doctrine,44 which does not adequately account for expansive 
prosecutorial discretion. 
                                                                                                                            
 40 Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We 
Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403–04 (2003). 
 41 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 
N (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/TableN.pdf (citing 2007 
statistics revealing that federal judges sentence within the Guideline range 60.8% of the 
time and that in an additional 25.6% of the cases, the departure responds to a government 
motion). Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the defendant’s sentence is determined by 
the public prosecutor. 
 42 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 43 It is possible to read the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, for example, as a 
reclamation of the powers of the sentencing judge from the federal prosecutor. See Stith, 
supra note 27, at 1482 (arguing that Booker effected a “reinvigoration of the sentencing 
judge”).  By rendering the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, the Supreme Court ensured 
that prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining decisions would not be the last word in 
determining criminal sentences.  Instead, the federal judiciary reclaimed some of its 
authority over this task.  In this respect, Booker demonstrates the necessity of judicial 
compliance in maintaining broad prosecutorial discretion—when judges choose to 
constrain prosecutorial discretion, they can do so. 
 44 See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 
1973) (“The primary ground upon which this traditional judicial aversion to compelling 
prosecutions has been based is the separation of powers doctrine.”); Prosecutorial 
Discretion, supra note 21, at 197. 
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D.  The Separation of Prosecutorial Powers Doctrine 
In United States v. Cox, the Fifth Circuit stated that “it is as an 
officer of the executive department that [the federal prosecutor] exercises 
a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a 
particular case.”45  Accordingly, the court reasoned that “[i]t follows, as 
an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are 
not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the 
attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal 
prosecutions.”46  The Supreme Court has endorsed this theory, remarking 
that “the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict . . 
. has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive 
Branch.”47  Lower federal courts also invoke the separation of powers 
doctrine to defend their hands-off approach to prosecutors’ decisions.48 
Since “the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is at the very core of the 
executive function,”49 limiting that discretion by imposing judicial 
review “would invade the traditional separation of powers doctrine.”50 
The “Take Care” Clause (providing that the President “shall take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed”) is the constitutional text cited 
most frequently to support this argument,51 although the clause itself 
does not explicitly provide for executive control over criminal 
prosecutions.52  Otherwise, courts provide few doctrinal justifications for 
                                                                                                                            
 45 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); see also United States v. Armstrong, 
517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (holding that the separation of powers doctrine requires broad 
prosecutorial discretion). 
 48 See, e.g., In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 452–54 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that 
courts should refrain from interfering with decisions to dismiss charges, because the 
power to prosecute is lodged in the executive branch); United States v. Arenas-Ortiz, 339 
F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the decision to bring charges is 
constitutionally assigned to executive branch); United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 
512 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that judicial review of prosecutorial decisions poses 
separation of powers problems); United States v. Smith, 178 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(holding that prosecutorial discretion is central to the executive function); United States 
v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1438 (10th Cir. 1995) (expressing concern that second-
guessing prosecutorial decisions about plea agreements would raise separation of powers 
issues); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting, in the 
context of prosecutorial discretion, that “it is not the function of the judiciary to review 
the exercise of executive discretion whether it be that of the President himself or those to 
whom he has delegated certain of his powers”). 
 49 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 50 United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass’n, 228 F.Supp. 
483, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (holding that the courts cannot compel the prosecution of an 
indictment). 
 51 See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3; William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the 
Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 484 (1989). 
 52 See infra Part II. 
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broad prosecutorial discretion; the Fifth Circuit’s formulation of the 
doctrine in Cox is widely cited and treated as conclusive.53  The Cox 
court’s statements typify the “modern separation of prosecutorial powers 
doctrine,” which, as suggested below, is more controversial than 
contemporary courts typically acknowledge. 
E.  Criticism by Comparison to Related Areas of Law 
In the case law on prosecutorial discretion, the separation of 
prosecutorial powers doctrine supports two conclusions: that the federal 
prosecutor has discretion to decide whether and how to prosecute a case, 
and that a federal court cannot review the prosecutor’s decisions.  The 
constitutional separation of powers doctrine does not, however, 
adequately explain expansive prosecutorial discretion.  Instead, 
prosecutorial discretion is in tension with the account of separated 
powers that appears elsewhere, particularly in administrative law.54 
The federal prosecutor’s broad and unreviewable authority is an 
anomaly in our system of separated powers.  The Framers’ “constant aim 
[was] to divide and arrange the several offices [of government] in such a 
manner as that each may be a check on the other,”55 yet the other 
branches of government provide almost no check on prosecutorial 
powers.  Rachel Barkow has remarked that “[o]ne need not be an expert 
in separation-of-powers theory to know that combining [modern 
prosecutorial] powers in a single actor can lead to gross abuses.”56  The 
federal judiciary has avoided confronting this tension by invoking the 
separation of powers doctrine in name only,57 without addressing why 
                                                                                                                            
 53 See, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 960 (10th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Davis, 
285 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2002); Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 180 (3rd Cir. 1973); Inmates of Attica 
Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379  (2d Cir. 1973). 
 54 Accord Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 989, 993 (2006) (arguing that “the existing approach to separation of powers in 
criminal matters cannot be squared with constitutional theory or sound institutional 
design”).  Barkow argues that criminal law could be improved if it applied the 
constitutional separation of powers doctrine more rigorously.  As a result, prosecutorial 
discretion would be limited, since a system “where prosecutors make all the key 
judgments does not fit comfortably with the separation of powers.”  Id. at 1049.  I do not 
engage Barkow’s policy suggestions, but I do adopt her characterization of the separation 
of prosecutorial powers theory. 
 55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 56 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009). 
 57 One noteworthy exception is United States v. Abreu, 747 F.Supp. 493 (N.D. IL 
1990), in which an Illinois district court denied an Assistant United States Attorney’s 
motion to dismiss an indictment based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48a. See 
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that doctrine should bar all judicial review of prosecutorial decisions.  
Federal judges commonly review actions undertaken by other branches 
of government, such as administrative agencies within the executive 
branch.  Such judicial review is an important component of the system of 
separated powers; the judiciary both checks the power of other branches 
and asserts its own “emphatic” duty “to say what the law is.”58  The 
Supreme Court has addressed these separation of powers issues 
extensively in administrative law59 and has developed principles of 
judicial review that enable administrative agencies to function while 
protecting against abuse. 
In criminal procedure, the Court has not developed comparable 
safeguards against abuse by federal prosecutors.60  As a result, the 
separation of powers doctrine invoked in prosecutorial discretion cases 
differs from the separation of powers doctrine in administrative law.  
Administrative agencies, many of which are part of the executive branch, 
are subject to judicial review and reversal for “arbitrary and capricious” 
actions.61  Agencies must articulate rational, legally acceptable reasons 
for their decisions.62  Federal prosecutors have no such obligation, 
ostensibly because they are situated in the executive branch—but so are 
most agencies.63  Remarking on this comparison between administrative 
and criminal procedure, Kenneth Culp Davis contended that if separated 
powers really barred judicial review of executive decisions, “then more 
                                                                                                                            
supra note 30.  Responding to the government’s argument that the separation of powers 
doctrine precluded the court from denying its motion, the court observed that “the 
government has failed to carry its ‘separation of powers’ argument to the next logical 
step.  Equally intrinsic to our system of government is a delicate system of ‘checks and 
balances.’ . . . From this, it seems altogether proper to say the phrase “by leave of court” 
in Rule 48(a) was intended to modify and condition the absolute power of the executive, 
consistently with the framers’ concept of separation of powers, by erecting a check on the 
abuse of executive prerogatives.”  Abreu, 747 F.Supp. at 502.  Although the Abreu 
court’s point seems right, it is uncommon one in the federal jurisprudence of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
 58 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Abreu, 747 
F.Supp. at 502 (noting the importance of judicial review to the “checks and balances” 
inherent in a system of separated powers). 
 59 See Barkow, supra note 54, at 991–93. Barkow argues that the rise of the 
administrative state prompted the Court to address separation of powers issues in 
administrative law. 
 60 Id. 
 61 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
 62 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 
52 (1983). 
 63 Even the federal agency responsible for determining criminal sentences, the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, differs from other administrative agencies in that it is not 
subject to arbitrary and capricious review. See Barkow, supra note 54, at 995. 
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than a hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over a century and three-
quarters will have to be found contrary to the Constitution!”64 
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In the wake of the breadth of prosecutorial discretion, and the fact 
that the separation of powers doctrine does not fully account for this 
concentration of power in one executive actor, the narrower historical 
question still remains as to how federal courts came to accept the 
separation of prosecutorial powers theory as justification for 
prosecutorial discretion.  Davis thought that “the best short answer seems 
to be that no one has done any systematic thinking to produce the[se] 
assumptions, but that the customs about prosecuting . . . are the product 
of unplanned evolution.”65  This Part traces this evolution in the 
American case law on prosecutorial discretion, beginning with the law of 
the nolle prosequi and ending with the first modern statement of the 
separation of prosecutorial powers doctrine.  First, however, Part II.A 
briefly reviews evidence of the executive’s control over law enforcement 
in early American history to provide some background for the cases that 
follow. 
A.  The Executive’s Control Over Law Enforcement 
One premise of the separation of prosecutorial powers theory is that 
criminal law enforcement is, and always has been, an exclusively 
executive function.  The executive has not, however, always had 
exclusive control over criminal prosecutions. 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson 
inspired a small body of historical scholarship addressing executive 
control over criminal prosecutions.  In Morrison, the Court upheld the 
appointment of a special prosecutor not accountable to the President.66  
In dissent, Justice Scalia wrote, “[g]overnmental investigation and 
prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function,” and is 
“the virtual embodiment of the power to ‘take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.’”67  According to Justice Scalia, the executive had 
“always and everywhere” controlled criminal law enforcement.68 
In Morrison’s aftermath, many scholars—including Harold Krent, 
William Gwyn, Lawrence Lessig, and Cass Sunstein—disagreed with 
                                                                                                                            
 64 DAVIS, supra note 14, at 210 (criticizing the language of United States v. Cox, 342 
F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), quoted above). 
 65 Id. at 189. 
 66 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 67 Id. at 706, 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 68 Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia and argued that as a historical matter, prosecution was not 
an exclusively executive function.69  Several pointed out that the 
constitutional text upon which Justice Scalia relied, the “Take Care” 
Clause, does not explicitly provide for executive control over criminal 
prosecutions.70  The “Take Care” Clause’s origins suggest that it was 
intended to be a statement of the President’s duties, not a conferral of 
power.71  Similarly, no other part of the Constitution grants the executive 
full control over federal law enforcement.72 
Most of the scholars writing after Morrison concluded that in 
practice, the executive branch had only limited control over early 
criminal prosecutions.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the Attorney 
General and vested his appointment with the President, but the Framers 
did not establish an executive department underneath the Attorney 
General to conduct criminal prosecutions.73  The same act created 
“district attorneys” (the first federal prosecutors), but they did not report 
to the Attorney General until 1861.74  This state of affairs persisted 
despite repeated complaints to Congress from attorneys general and 
presidents.75  With the executive having little direct control over criminal 
prosecutions, private citizens and the other branches of government 
played a large role in enforcing criminal law.76  Reviewing these 
                                                                                                                            
 69 See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in our 
Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561; 
Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. 
Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 (1990); Gwyn, supra note 51; Harold 
J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 
38 AM. U.L. REV. 275 (1989); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and 
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 70 See Krent, supra note 69, at 282; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 15. 
 71 See Dangel, supra note 69, at 1077–78; Gwyn, supra note 51, at 491–92. The 
history of the first Judiciary Act supports a limited reading of the “Take Care” Clause as 
well. As enacted, the Act vested appointment of the Attorney General with the President. 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (1861). An original draft of the 
Judiciary Act, however, vested appointment of the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys 
(then called “district attorneys”) with federal district courts. See Charles Warren, New 
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 108–09 
(1924). At least half of the relevant Senate committee members accepted this 
formulation, suggesting that they did not consider executive control over criminal 
prosecutors to be constitutionally compelled. See Gwyn, supra note 51, at 494. 
 72 See Krent, supra note 69, at 282; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 15. 
 73 See Bloch, supra note 69, at 567; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 16. The 
Department of Justice was not established until 1870. See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 
16 Stat. 162. 
 74 See The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 456–57 (1868); Krent, supra note 69, at 
286–90; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 16–17. 
 75 See Krent, supra note 69, at 286–90. 
 76 See RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1634–1941 at 27–28 (1963) (noting the influence of citizen grand juries in early 
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arguments, Lessig and Sunstein concluded that “[i]f the framers’ and 
early Congresses’ actual practice is any indication of their original 
understanding, then they did not understand prosecution to be within the 
notion of ‘executive Power’ exclusively. . . .”77 
                                                                                                                            
American history); Dangel, supra note 69, at 1086–87 (describing the role of private 
citizens and judges in criminal prosecutions); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 19–21 
(describing the role of private citizens in criminal prosecutions); Krent, supra note 69, at 
293-310 (describing the role of private citizens and state officials in criminal 
prosecutions); Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal 
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 568 (1984). 
 77 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 15. Saikrishna Prakash has written the most 
notable scholarly article disagreeing with this conclusion. See Saikrishna Prakash, The 
Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005). Prakash argued that American 
prosecutors inherited their membership in the executive branch from English criminal 
procedure, in which “the king was regarded as the constitutional prosecutor of all 
offenses.”  Id. at 547.  In England, however, the tradition of private prosecution by the 
crime victim was dominant, at least in theory, until late in the twentieth century, see 
supra note 4, and the English Crown was not in exclusive control of criminal 
prosecutions.  Prakash also provided accounts of early American presidents directing 
Attorneys General or district attorneys to enforce a particular law or to issue a nolle 
prosequi. Prakash, supra at 553–63.  He acknowledged evidence, however, that district 
attorneys received direction from other branches of government as well. See Prakash, 
supra at 549 n.171 (noting evidence that district attorneys received similar instructions 
from the judiciary).  As a result, Prakash demonstrated that the executive branch 
exercised some control over early criminal prosecutions.  He did not, however, prove that 
criminal prosecution was originally an exclusively executive function. 
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B.  The Nolle Prosequi78 
In England, the nolle prosequi was a procedural device that the 
royally appointed Attorney General could use to terminate an ongoing 
criminal prosecution.79  Most likely beginning in the sixteenth century, 
the Attorney General used the procedure to dismiss prosecutions that he 
regarded as frivolous or in contravention of royal interests.80  Since most 
criminal prosecutions in the early modern period were initiated and 
managed by private citizens, the nolle prosequi was the only form of 
“prosecutorial discretion” exercised by a public figure.  The nolle was an 
executive procedure, available only to the Attorney General and often 
exercised at the explicit direction of the Crown.  No form of judicial 
review was available if a party contested the propriety of the procedure: 
when the Attorney General issued a nolle, the court would terminate the 
prosecution without any inquiry.81 
American criminal procedure absorbed the nolle prosequi, and in 
federal practice both the American President and line prosecutors 
                                                                                                                            
 78 In turning to the case law on prosecutorial discretion, a brief note must be made 
regarding the sources underlying the arguments put forth in this section.  Although I have 
made an effort to locate district court cases, reported case law originates mostly from 
appellate-level courts.  As a result, the sources are skewed away from those discretionary 
decisions made by the judges who most frequently make them—district court judges.  In 
the states, the development of prosecutorial elections beginning in the mid-nineteenth 
century prompted a justification for prosecutorial discretion entirely distinct from the 
federal separation of powers doctrine.  Direct voter control over the district attorney 
might justify a range of discretionary powers broader than that supported by the 
executive supervision of federal prosecutors. See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, Understanding 
Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal 
Procedure As An Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1339–44 (1993) (arguing 
that an official making decisions as important as those made by public prosecutors should 
answer directly to voters, and highlighting the American preference for local control over 
governmental authority).  State court judges sometimes cite a prosecutor’s elected status 
as an explanation for their refusal to interfere with his decisions. See, e.g., State v. 
Annala, 484 N.W.2d 138, 146 (Wis. 1992) (“On numerous occasions, we have explained 
that in general the district attorney is answerable to the people of the state and not to the 
courts or the legislature as to the manner in which he or she exercises prosecutorial 
discretion.”).  See also JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR 
IDENTITY 25-27 (1980); NICHOLAS PARRILLO, THE RISE OF NON PROFIT GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICA (forthcoming) (manuscript at 67–68, on file with SETON HALL CIRCUIT 
REVIEW). 
Accordingly, I have not included any state case law from this period or later, with the 
exception of an 1806 case evidencing the fact that early state courts treated the nolle 
prosequi similarly to federal courts. 
 79 See ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 12 (1981). 
 80 Id.; see, e.g., Goddard v. Smith, 87 Eng. Rep. 1007, 91 Eng. Rep. 632 (K.B. 1704) 
(issuing a nolle prosequi to remedy a wrongful charge). 
 81 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 79. 
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inherited the power to nol pros.82  Although the name was the same, the 
nolle served a different function in America than it had in England.  In 
the English system of private prosecution, the nolle was an isolated 
control point available to the Crown.  In America, public prosecutors 
used the nolle to terminate prosecutions that they had themselves 
initiated.  As a result, the American nolle was one of many procedural 
devices that public officials used to control criminal prosecutions. 
Public debate regarding the nolle prosequi power in the United 
States occurred at the end of the eighteenth century.  In February 1799, 
Jonathan Robbins (also known as Thomas Nash) was arrested in South 
Carolina and accused of participating in a mutiny on a British ship, the 
Hermione.83  Britain formally requested his extradition pursuant to the 
Jay Treaty.84  Robbins was one of many sailors who had participated in 
the Hermione mutiny, and his was not the first case to reach American 
courts.  A year earlier, three of his fellow Hermione crewmembers had 
been arrested in Trenton, New Jersey.85  In the case of one such 
crewmember, William Brigstock, the district attorney had issued a nolle 
prosequi “in obedience to the special command of the President of the 
United States.”86  President Adams’s interpretation of the Jay Treaty 
changed, however, in the year following Brigstock’s arrest.87  As a result, 
Secretary of State Pickering told the federal district judge hearing 
Robbins’s case that the “President has . . . authorized me to communicate 
to you ‘his advice and request,’ that Thomas Nash may be delivered up,” 
provided that “such evidence of his criminality be produced, as by the 
laws of the United States, or of South Carolina, would justify his 
apprehension and commitment for trial.”88  After a hearing, in which 
Robbins claimed to be an American citizen and defended his actions 
aboard the Hermione,89 the judge acquiesced to Pickering’s request and 
ordered Robbins delivered to the British.90  British troops brought 
                                                                                                                            
 82 See Prakash, supra note 77, at 549–60. 
 83 See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 
YALE L.J. 229, 237 (1990). 
 84 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, art. 27, 
8 Stat. 116, 129, T.S. No. 105. 
 85 See Wedgwood, supra note 83. 
 86 Id. at 278 (citing Notice of Nolle Prosequi (1798), reprinted in untitled pamphlet 
headed “Circuit Court of the United States, Middle Circuit of the New-Jersey District. 
The United States (a.) William Brigstock,” available in EARLY AMERICAN 
IMPRINTS, 1639–1800, Evans No. 38723). 
 87 See Wedgwood, supra note 83, at 288–89. 
 88 4 STATE PAPERS AND PUBLICK DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES [WAIT’S 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS] 304 (2d ed. Boston 1817). 
 89 United States v. Rob[b]ins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 827–31 (D.C.S.C. 1799). 
 90 See id. at 833. 
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Robbins to Jamaica, where they court marshaled and executed him 
within a week.91 
The Robbins case caused a public outcry, and President Adams 
narrowly escaped congressional censure and impeachment.  In the House 
of Representatives, John Marshall was President Adams’s most 
persuasive advocate.92  Marshall argued: 
It is not the privilege, it is the sad duty of courts to administer 
criminal judgment. It is a duty to be performed at the demand of 
the nation, and with which the nation has a right to dispense. If 
judgment of death is to be pronounced, it must be at the 
prosecution of the nation, and the nation may at will stop that 
prosecution. In this respect the president expresses 
constitutionally the will of the nation; and may rightfully, as was 
done in the case at Trenton, enter a nolle prosequi, or direct that 
the criminal be prosecuted no further. This is no interference with 
judicial decisions, nor any invasion of the province of a court. It 
is the exercise of an indubitable and a constitutional power.93 
Marshall insisted that the President had discretion to issue a nolle 
prosequi, and followed the English law that the court is powerless to 
review or deny an exercise of the writ.  The nolle is an executive 
prerogative, not a judicial power.94  In the precise context of the nolle 
prosequi, this statement of unreviewable executive discretion had a solid 
foundation in English history.  Marshall’s speech suggests that American 
criminal procedure absorbed from English law the principle that an 
exercise of the nolle power was immune from judicial review. 
Marshall’s reasoning, however, went beyond English precedent. In 
Marshall’s account, the duty of administering criminal judgment “is a 
duty to be performed at the demand of the nation, and with which the 
nation has a right to dispense.”95  As a result, a judgment “must be at the 
prosecution of the nation;” since the President “expresses constitutionally 
the will of the nation,” he may “rightfully” direct the prosecution—in 
this case, by entering a nolle.96  In defending the President’s nolle power, 
then, Marshall implied that executive control over criminal prosecutions 
more generally was appropriate because of the President’s representative 
capacity. Marshall did not go so far as to state that all executive 
                                                                                                                            
 91 See Wedgwood, supra note 83, at 304. 
 92 See id. at 234. 
 93 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 615 (1800). Marshall’s famous speech was also recorded in 
the Appendix of Wheaton’s Supreme Court opinions. See 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) app. (1820). 
 94 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 95 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 615. 
 96 Id. 
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prosecutorial decisions were insulated from judicial review. In expanding 
on the President’s nolle power, however, Marshall’s speech created the 
first connection between the nolle prosequi and the theory of 
unreviewable executive prosecutorial discretion. 
From the Nolle Prosequi to Prosecutorial Discretion 
There are two important differences between executive control over 
the nolle prosequi and modern prosecutorial discretion.  The President’s 
power to direct criminal prosecutions does not necessarily imply that all 
line prosecutors should exercise the same unreviewable discretion.  
Moreover, the power to terminate a prosecution using the nolle prosequi 
is, in chronology and significance, distinct from the discretion to make 
an initial charging decision.  This section explores the limited case law 
that eliminated these two distinctions, bridging the gap between the 
executive nolle prosequi and the modern theory of prosecutorial 
discretion. 
From the Chief Executive to Line Prosecutors 
In England, the royal Attorney General did not share the nolle 
prosequi with other government officials; no formal public prosecutor 
existed.97  In the American system of public prosecution, by contrast, the 
President shared the power to nol pros with public prosecutors, even 
though the first American “district attorneys” were not clearly under the 
President’s control.98  An 1802 case, Virginia v. Dulany, is among the 
first to make this clear.  In Dulany, a District of Columbia federal court 
held that the private prosecutor who initiated the case “had no right to 
withdraw the prosecution,” and the court “refused to permit it to be done 
without the consent of the attorney for the United States.”99  The Dulany 
court thereby implied that the U.S. attorney had the power to nol pros.  
Although the Dulany opinion did not discuss this deviation from English 
                                                                                                                            
 97 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 98 See supra Part II.A.  The line between “presidential” and “executive” functions—
the former limited to the President himself, and the latter to all members of the executive 
branch—is not always clear. See A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of 
Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 793–95 (1987).  Drawing this line 
with respect to prosecutorial discretion in early American history is even more difficult 
because, as described above, the first “district attorneys” were not clearly under the 
President’s control.  As a result, the power of early public prosecutors to nol pros 
unilaterally should not have been inherently obvious, considering the ambiguous position 
early prosecutors held within the branches of government.  In addition, Marshall’s 
popular representation theory of the nolle prosequi does not apply directly to unelected 
public prosecutors. 
 99 Virginia v. Dulany, 28 F. Cas. 1223, 1223 (D.D.C. 1802). 
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practice, the case is the first to eliminate (or blur) the distinction between 
the royal or presidential nolle prosequi and the powers of the line 
prosecutor. 
From an early time, line prosecutors also shared the President’s 
immunity from judicial review in using the nolle prosequi.  A 
Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Wheeler, indicates as much.100  
The Wheeler defendants had been indicted for assault and battery on 
“one Deliverance Brown.”101  In their defense, they pointed out that the 
state’s public prosecutor had issued a nolle prosequi on an earlier 
indictment for the same offense.  The court held that the earlier nolle was 
not a bar to subsequent indictment.  The judge remarked on the 
procedure’s “ancient” origins and observed that “[c]ertainly, the court are 
not legally competent to give any advice on this subject.  The power of 
entering a nolle prosequi is to be exercised at the discretion of the 
attorney who prosecutes for the government, and for its exercise he alone 
is responsible.”102 
Like Dulany, Wheeler affirmed the line prosecutor’s power to enter 
a nolle prosequi.  Wheeler also emphasized that the nolle was not subject 
to judicial review, even when a public prosecutor—rather than the 
President or monarch—entered it.  In this respect, the nolle prosequi 
appears to have provided the first American manifestation of the notion 
that prosecutorial discretion was not reviewable.  American courts 
recognized the line prosecutor’s right to enter a nolle, applied the same 
form of judicial review to the nolle that had been practiced in England, 
and thereby adopted a hands-off approach to at least one prosecutorial 
decision. 
From the Power to Nol Pros to the Power to Charge 
When the prosecutor can unilaterally dismiss a case, ordering him 
to initiate a criminal prosecution is futile.  As a result, the prosecutor’s 
unreviewable nolle power appears to have contributed to the expansion 
of prosecutorial discretion to include the charging decision as well.  An 
1809 opinion by John Marshall contains clues to this development.  In 
                                                                                                                            
 100 Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 2 Mass. 172 (1806).  Although my primary focus here 
is on federal cases, I would be remiss to ignore Commonwealth v. Wheeler, which 
provides one of the most extended early discussions of the nolle prosequi in American 
case law.  For a full discussion of Wheeler and other early state court cases that came to 
similar conclusions, see PARRILLO, supra note 78, at 55–57. In describing this case law, 
Parrillo does not discern any difference between federal and state sources that would 
preclude Wheeler from being relevant for my federally-oriented analysis. Id. At this point 
in American history, both state and federal prosecutors were appointed, not elected. 
 101 Wheeler, 2 Mass. at 172. 
 102 Id. at 174. 
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United States v. Hill, a grand jury returned formal indictments and 
informal presentments against the defendant.103  The federal prosecutor 
entered a nolle prosequi exclusively with respect to the indictments, and 
the defendant moved to quash the presentments.104  Declining to do so, 
Justice Marshall, sitting as the trial judge, observed that American courts 
would typically “pass over, unnoticed, presentments on which the 
attorney does not think it proper to institute proceedings.  This usage is 
convenient, because it avoids the waste of time, which would often be 
consumed in the inquiry, whether the court could take jurisdiction of the 
offence presented.”105 
The jurisdictional inquiry that Marshall describes would only be 
“wasted” if its resolution had no bearing on the case’s outcome.  At the 
time Hill was decided, federal prosecutors used the nolle prosequi 
frequently.106  Since public prosecutors could (and often did) nolle any 
charges, proceeding with a presentment “on which the [district] attorney 
[did] not think it proper to institute proceedings” would presumably lead 
only to a nolle.  Marshall’s observation reflects the connection between 
the power to nol pros charges and the power to initiate them.  The 
“usage” of deferring to the prosecutor’s decision on when to institute 
proceedings saved time for the courts, and effectively increased the 
scope of prosecutorial discretion to include the charging decision. 
Nascent Separation of Powers Arguments 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, federal courts began to 
associate the nolle prosequi and prosecutorial discretion with executive 
power more explicitly.  The Confiscation Cases of 1868 provide the best 
example.  During the first months of the Civil War, Congress passed a 
statute subjecting to forfeiture all property that was knowingly used in 
rebellion against the United States.107  The statute provided that an 
informer who supplied information leading to a forfeiture would share in 
the proceeds with the United States, although only the federal public 
prosecutor could bring the confiscation suit.108  In The Confiscation 
Cases, the Attorney General moved to dismiss an ongoing confiscation 
suit and the informers who stood to benefit from the confiscation 
                                                                                                                            
 103 United States v. Hill, 26 F.Cas. 315 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, D. VA 1809). 
 104 Id. at 315. 
 105 Id. at 316. 
 106 Between 1801 and 1828, a full third of all federal indicted cases ended with a nolle 
prosequi. See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829, Appx. I, at 213 (1985). 
 107 See The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 454–55 (1868) (discussing the Act of 
August 6, 1861). 
 108 Id. at 455. 
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opposed the motion.109  The Supreme Court affirmed the Attorney 
General’s power to dismiss the suit.  Although the case was civil in 
nature, the Court discussed the executive’s powers in both civil and 
criminal matters, and the case is widely cited for its application to 
prosecutorial powers.110  The Court stated that “[p]ublic prosecutions . . . 
are so far under [the district attorney’s] control that he may enter a nolle 
prosequi at any time before the jury is empanelled.”111 
Most significantly, the Court also offered a justification for the 
district attorney’s control over public prosecutions: “[a]ppointed, as the 
Attorney-General is, in pursuance of an act of Congress, to prosecute and 
conduct such suits, argument would seem to be unnecessary to prove his 
authority to dispose of these [confiscation] cases in the manner 
proposed,” that is, dismissing them.112  The “act of Congress” to which 
the Court referred was the Judiciary Act, under which the President had 
appointed the Attorney General.  According to the Court, then, the 
Attorney General’s discretion to dispose of criminal cases was justified 
by his executive appointment.  As a result, neither the Court nor private 
citizens could interfere with the Attorney General’s decision.  The 
separation of powers rationale is not here in so many words, but the 
public prosecutor’s discretion is indirectly linked to executive power. 
The Supreme Court’s Confiscation Cases opinion cited a South 
Carolina district court case from a decade earlier, United States v. 
Corrie.113  Corrie involved jurisdictional issues surrounding the 
application of an anti-slavery law.  The U.S. attorney’s motion for a nolle 
prosequi provided the court with an opportunity to discuss executive 
power over a criminal prosecution.114  For the first time in federal case 
                                                                                                                            
 109 Id. 
 110 Westlaw reveals 185 citing references for The Confiscation Cases, many of which 
have been mentioned earlier in this Article. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 
831 (1985); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); In re United States, 
345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 191 (5th Cir. 
1965); United States v. Flemmi, 283 F.Supp.2d 400, 407 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 111 Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. at 457. 
 112 Id. at 458.  Although “argument would seem to be unnecessary,” the Court does 
provide one citation in support of its conclusion, to a case called The Gray Jacket.  The 
Gray Jacket, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 370 (1866), holds only that “in causes where the United 
States is a party, and is represented by the Attorney-General or the Assistant Attorney-
General, or special counsel employed by the Attorney-General, no counsel can be heard 
in opposition on behalf of any other of the departments of the government.”  72 U.S. at 
370. 
 113 74 U.S. at 457 n.5. (citing United States v. Corrie, 25 F.Cas. 658 (D.C.S.C. 1860)). 
 114 Corrie was unusual, as the judge denied the U.S. attorney’s requests to enter a 
nolle prosequi. Id. at 669. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, some American 
courts began to express concerns about the public prosecutor’s discretionary power to 
enter a nolle prosequi. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Shoemaker, 27 F.Cas. 1067, 1069–
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law, the district court in Corrie identified the “Take Care” Clause as the 
textual source of the President’s power over criminal prosecutions.115  
The executive’s nolle power was not originally derived from the “Take 
Care” Clause, but Corrie Americanized the procedure by connecting it to 
the constitutional text and the President’s powers.  Today, the “Take 
Care” Clause is the most commonly cited textual support for executive 
control over criminal prosecutions.116  Like The Confiscation Cases, 
Corrie linked the nolle and prosecutorial discretion more broadly to the 
executive’s constitutional powers, making a nascent separation of 
prosecutorial powers argument. 
The Modern Theory Replaces the Nolle 
In the early twentieth century, the Corrie court’s approach to 
prosecutorial discretion was adopted more broadly and the separation of 
prosecutorial powers theory became well-established in federal case law.  
As a result, prosecutorial discretion was no longer linked to the nolle 
prosequi; the separation of prosecutorial powers theory began to stand 
alone.  Two cases from the 1920s, which ground prosecutorial discretion 
in the separation of powers doctrine rather than in the nolle power, reveal 
as much. 
The Emergence of the Modern Theory 
In the 1922 case Ponzi v. Fessenden, the Supreme Court connected 
the executive’s power over criminal prosecutions to the “Take Care” 
Clause for the first time.117  The district court in Corrie had done the 
same while discussing the nolle power sixty-two years earlier,118 but 
Ponzi was a much more influential case.119  Unlike Corrie, Ponzi made 
                                                                                                                            
69 (D. IL 1840).  As a result, disagreement developed over the proper role of the court in 
responding to a prosecutor’s motion to enter a nolle prosequi. See United States v. 
Krakowitz, 52 F.Supp. 774, 784 (S.D. OH 1943) (summarizing, after a lengthy review, 
contradictory case law on this question).  Most courts read the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in The Confiscation Cases as putting an end to this dispute. See id. at 779–80. 
 115 25 F.Cas. at 668. 
 116 See Gwyn, supra note 51, at 484. 
 117 See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) (stating that the Attorney 
General was “the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in 
protection of the interests of the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution 
of offenses, be faithfully executed”). 
 118 Ponzi did not cite Corrie.  Instead, Ponzi cited three previous Supreme Court cases 
to support the proposition quoted in note 119, but none were on point: two addressed the 
Attorney General’s power in civil cases, and one addressed the President’s relationship 
with U.S. Marshals. See id.; Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147 (1921); In re 
Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888). 
 119 Lower federal courts addressing prosecutorial discretion occasionally cite Ponzi. 
See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 
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no mention of the nolle prosequi, and instead affirmed the executive’s 
control over criminal prosecutions independently of the historic nolle 
power.  The Fifth Circuit cited Ponzi in its leading case on the separation 
of prosecutorial powers doctrine, United States v. Cox.120 
In 1925, a federal district court in New York stated the separation 
of powers theory of prosecutorial discretion unequivocally, in Milliken v. 
Stone.121  During Prohibition, American shipping companies complained 
that the Attorney General was not enforcing liquor laws against British 
ships that carried alcohol.  The American companies sought an 
injunction prohibiting government officials from “failing, refusing, or 
neglecting to institute suits under [the National Prohibition Act], to abate 
and/or enjoin liquor nuisances, and to prosecute . . . offenders under said 
act.”122  The court dismissed the suit, concluding, “the federal courts are 
without power to compel the prosecuting officers to enforce the penal 
laws, whatever the grounds of their failure may be.  The remedy for 
inactivity of that kind is with the executive and ultimately with the 
people.”123 
Milliken expressed what has come to be the modern theory of 
prosecutorial discretion: the prosecutor on behalf of the executive makes 
criminal law enforcement decisions, which the courts are “powerless” to 
review.  Like John Marshall in his 1799 speech, the Milliken court left it 
to the citizenry to control its law enforcement officers.124  Marshall was 
referring to the president and the nolle prosequi, but his rationale for 
unreviewable executive discretion was not inherently limited to a 
president’s decision to issue a nolle.  Nineteenth century case law 
expanded prosecutorial discretion, recognizing that it applied to line 
prosecutors and to decisions other than the nolle.  Until the early 
twentieth century, however, the case law on prosecutorial discretion 
almost always mentioned the nolle prosequi and the judicial deference 
that accompanied the procedure.  By the time Milliken was decided, 
judges no longer felt the need to make this connection; unreviewable 
prosecutorial discretion was the established rule.  The nolle disappeared 
from judicial opinions on prosecutorial discretion, but the affiliated 
theory of exclusive executive power remained.  The procedure that once 
                                                                                                                            
342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965). Corrie, by contrast, was only cited by four cases in the 
twentieth century. Westlaw search for citing references last conducted on July 28, 2009. 
 120 See Cox, 342 F.2d at 172 n.6. 
 121 Milliken v. Stone, 7 F.2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1925). 
 122 Id. at 398. 
 123 Id. at 399. 
 124 See supra note 95 (stating that administering criminal judgment is a “duty to be 
performed at the demand of the nation, and with which the nation has a right to 
dispense”). 
2009] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 25 
constituted the government’s only basis for controlling criminal 
prosecutions had provided a doctrinal foundation for the public 
prosecutor’s broad discretionary power. 
Twentieth Century Limitations on the Nolle 
In 1944, Congress amended the rules of procedure to require 
judicial approval for a prosecutor’s use of a nolle prosequi.  By this time, 
however, the separation of powers theory of prosecutorial discretion was 
established in federal case law, and no longer linked to the nolle 
prosequi. As a result, legislative efforts to limit the nolle did little to 
check prosecutorial discretion more broadly. 
Congress and the state legislatures that limited the nolle were 
responding to concerns that prosecutors were abusing the power to nol 
pros as case loads increased.125  In 1930, Roscoe Pound contended that 
“[w]here the number of prosecutions each year has become enormous—
far beyond the possibilities of trial—the common-law unlimited power of 
nol pros becomes a means of selection of those to be prosecuted . . . .”126  
The nolle, originally “a public check upon private prosecutions,” had 
become “a power needing check” according to Pound.127  In 1944, the 
federal courts adopted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), which 
provides that “[t]he government may, with leave of court, dismiss an 
indictment, information, or complaint.”128  At least formally, the nolle 
prosequi was no longer the best example of unreviewable prosecutorial 
discretion.  Instead, it was one of the few prosecutorial decisions subject 
to judicial review. 
In practice, however, legislative efforts to limit the nolle had 
“remarkably little impact” and judges rarely denied prosecutors’ motions 
to dismiss.129  By the time Rule 48(a) was amended, the notion of 
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion was well-established in federal 
case law, grounded in the separation of powers doctrine rather than the 
nolle prosequi.  
                                                                                                                            
 125 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 82, at 14–15. 
 126 ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 187 (1930). 
 127 Id. 
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Contemporary “Prosecutorial Discretion” 
In 1961, the term “prosecutorial discretion” first appeared in 
American case law in a Supreme Court case, Poe v. Ullman.130 Poe 
involved a married couple’s request for declaratory relief against the 
enforcement of Connecticut’s anti-contraception laws.131  The prosecutor 
claimed that he had a right to enforce the Connecticut statute; in his 
dissent, Justice Harlan described this as a statement of “unbounded 
prosecutorial discretion.”132  The next judge to use the phrase was David 
Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit, in a dissent from a petition for rehearing en 
banc by a drug addict convicted of possession under federal law rather 
than more permissive state law.133  Bazelon expressed concern that “[t]he 
wide disparity in sentencing rigor under the two sets of statutes raises 
serious questions whether the permissible bounds of prosecutorial 
discretion have not been exceeded. What standards, if any, are applied in 
choosing between the statutes?”134  Like Harlan, Bazelon used the words 
“prosecutorial discretion” while expressing concern about its use.  By 
1975, the phrase “prosecutorial discretion” had appeared in nearly one 
hundred federal cases and marginally fewer state cases.  Twenty years 
later, there were over one thousand of each.135  “Prosecutorial 
discretion,” like the separation of prosecutorial powers doctrine that 
supports it, is now entrenched in modern case law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Today, plea-bargaining and prosecutorial discretion determine the 
outcome of the vast majority of criminal cases.  The prosecutor evaluates 
evidence and determines culpability in a process that is governed by very 
few legal standards.  In doing so he exercises broad discretionary 
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powers, whose doctrinal foundation—the separation of prosecutorial 
powers theory—is based, to some extent, on a procedure that originated 
in a system of private prosecution. 
There are other explanations for modern prosecutorial discretion, 
though, which reflect the reality of the criminal justice system rather than 
focusing on more abstract legal doctrine.  Heavy caseloads require 
prosecutors to prioritize between cases and dispose of many prosecutions 
by obtaining guilty pleas.136  Most of the discretionary decisions that 
prosecutors make in this process would, in practice, be very difficult for 
a court to review.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged as much: 
“[s]uch factors as . . . the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the 
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not 
readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to 
undertake.”137  By steadily adding to the federal criminal code, Congress 
forced law enforcement and prosecutors to choose which criminals to 
pursue and how to charge them.  Some prosecutorial discretion is 
inevitable in such a system. 
Gerard Lynch has argued that nostalgia for the criminal trial and 
regret over prosecutorial discretion distract from the projects of 
analyzing and improving the system we actually have.138  Instead, he 
accepts the inevitability of “prosecutorial adjudication” and advocates 
improving the system by introducing process values (such as hearings 
and discovery) into the pre-trial phase.139  None of Lynch’s suggestions 
would curtail prosecutorial discretion; as a result, he recognizes that they 
may be unsatisfying.140  Nor would his suggestions (or other realistic 
reform efforts) address the doctrinal concerns associated with the 
separation of powers justification for prosecutorial discretion. 
The question raised in this Article is not how to limit prosecutorial 
discretion, however, but how to account for the theory of prosecutorial 
discretion in federal case law.  I have argued that in federal case law, the 
nolle prosequi was, to some extent, the predecessor to the separation of 
powers theory of prosecutorial discretion.  The nolle prosequi was the 
only form of public “prosecutorial discretion” in England at the time of 
the American Revolution, and English courts did not review the Attorney 
General’s decision to use the procedure.  Although the United States 
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28 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 6:1 
developed different arrangements for prosecuting criminal cases, 
American courts adapted the practice of judicial nolle deference to 
prosecutorial decisions.  The executive’s power to issue a nolle 
unilaterally likewise became the executive’s power to make all 
prosecutorial decisions unilaterally. 
These origins help to explain, but not justify, the theory’s 
weaknesses and its tension with other areas of law.  Prosecutorial 
discretion may be necessary, but not because the separation of powers 
doctrine makes it so.  As a result, the federal courts may be better served 
by a theory of prosecutorial discretion designed for the American system 
of public prosecution, rather than adapted from a system very different 
from our own. 
 
